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This paper explores a landmark production in the history of Asian intercultural 
theatre, Singaporean director Ong Keng Sen and Japanese playwright Kishida 
Rio's Lear (1997/1999). A lavish production underwritten by the Japan 
Foundation Asia Center, Lear helped establish Ong's "fiercely intercultural" 
aesthetic as an internationally recognisable brand (Peterson 2003: 81). It also 
drew critique as a symbolic apologia for neoliberal globalisation. The critical 
literature on Lear has yielded trenchant insights into the global political 
significance of intercultural performance. At the same time, however, it has 
tended to overshadow questions of the work's aesthetic specificity and local 
significance. This paper seeks to recuperate Lear's local meanings both as a text 
and as a uniquely Singaporean political allegory. In the paper's first section, I 
will outline the play and its critique as late capitalist spectacle. In the following 
section, I will bracket this critique and return to the texts at hand. Finally, I will 
move back outward by tracing a Brechtian tension between Kishida's text, Ong's 
realisation, and the Singaporean state's "choreography" of racial, cultural and 
linguistic difference. 
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INTERCULTURALISM AS ALLEGORY AND SPECTACLE 
  
Both critics of intercultural performance and scholars of international law 
commonly frame the debate over interculturalism as a clash between a 
universalist conception of cultural works as "components of a common 
human culture" ("cultural internationalism") and a particularist conception 
of cultural works as "part of a national cultural heritage" ("cultural 
nationalism") (Merryman 1986: 831–832). This clash achieved international 
visibility largely as a result of developing states' struggles to repatriate 
"cultural treasures" looted during the age of High Colonialism (ibid.: 836–
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843). Behind it we find centuries of political and economic strife. We also 
find the familiar opposition of exchange-based and non-exchange-based 
systems of value. Cultural nationalism is distinguished by its insistence that 
the "true value" of a given cultural property is fundamentally non-
exchangeable: it "can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible 
information regarding its origin, history and traditional setting" (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 1970: 
135). In its radical form, cultural nationalism proposes that cultural property 
can only be truly understood or appreciated by members of the ethnic-
cultural community, and should not be removed from the ethnic-cultural 
homeland1 (Merryman 1986: 846). These issues are arguably less urgent 
where intangible, non-expendable cultural properties such as performing 
arts and languages are concerned. Nevertheless, the appropriation of 
intangible cultural properties by non-tradition-bearers almost inevitably 
provokes controversy (cf. Ziff 1997; Young 2010). 
Intercultural appropriation is most often thought of in connection with 
Western modernism and postmodernism. The appropriation and 
reinterpretation of Shakespeare, however, is a longstanding tradition in 
Asian theatre history.2 James R. Brandon identifies three styles of Asian 
Shakespeare: canonical productions, which attempt to reproduce an 
"authentically" English Shakespeare; localised productions, which transpose 
Shakespearean narratives into local performance idioms; and modern 
"intercultural" productions (1997: 3–17). Ong and Kishida's Lear, which 
juxtaposes elements of Chinese opera, Indonesian gamelan and pencak silat, 
Japanese nō and Thai courtly dance within a self-reflexively postmodernist 
framework, exemplifies this third type.   
Kishida's script differs notably from its mythic and literary 
predecessors.3 She retains the central protagonists, King Lear (the Old Man) 
and Cordelia (the Younger Daughter), however, she replaces Albany, 
Gloucester, Kent/Caius, Edgar/Tom, and Lear's Fool with two abstracted 
supporting protagonists, the Fool and the Loyal Attendant. Similarly, she 
replaces Goneril, Regan, Cornwall, Edmund and Oswald with an Older 
Daughter (accompanied by three Shadows), her Retainer and a host of 
Warriors. She adds a ghostly Mother and her retinue of silent attendants 
("Earth Mothers"), representing both King Lear's absent wife and Edmund's 
absent mother. Finally, she darkens the play's conclusion by having the 
Older Daughter murder and successfully usurps the Old Man.  
Ong's staging also defies convention. The Old Man and the Mother 
are played by Umekawa Naohiko, a Kanze school nō performer and scholar; 
the Older Daughter by Jiang Qihu, a performer in the China National 
Beijing Opera Company; the Younger Daughter by Thai dancer Peeramon 
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Chomdhavat; the Fool by Japanese film star Katagiri Hairi; the Attendant, 
Retainer, and Earth Mothers by Singaporean and Malaysian performers; and 
the Warriors by Indonesian pencak silat artists. On top of this, the 
production is multilingual, with each performer speaking their national 
language(s). The result is a semiotically fragmented mise-en-scène imparted 
with surface-level unity through sweeping musical and choreographic 
gestures. 
 In their program notes for the 1999 Singapore production, both Ong 
and producer Hata Yuki implicitly ask the audience to interpret Lear 
allegorically as an interrogation of Asian patriarchy.4 This theme is 
particularly relevant in Singapore, where for decades the reigning People's 
Action Party (PAP) has portrayed itself as a benevolent father to the nation 
(Chew 2004: 6). Notably, the relationship between the PAP and the nation is 
popularly represented as the relationship between a father and his daughter5 
(Heng and Devan 1995: 209). Moreover, the PAP has embraced policies 
which mandate or incentivise the reproduction of patrilineal social 
structures6 (cf. Chua 1996; Heng and Devan 1995; Clammer 1997; Teo 
2010; etc.). The most blatant of these is the registration of Singaporean 
children under their father's racial group: Chinese, Malay, Indian or Other 
(CMIO). In accordance with the CMIO system, every Singaporean is 
inscribed with a patrilineal "race-culture" and imputed with racial interests 
through interventionist policies on cultural, political and economic levels7 
(Chua 2007: 924). Ong's hyper-exoticised characters closely parallel the 
institutional division of Singaporeans into clearly demarcated racial-cultural 
blocs. 
 Beyond the metanarratives of patriarchy and patrilineality, certain 
specific aspects of Ong's staging and Kishida's reworked script invite closer 
political-allegorical interpretation. As prior scholars have noted, the 
Japanese Old Man and the Chinese Older Daughter clearly represent Asia's 
aspiring prewar and postwar hegemons (cf. Bharucha 2001). Conversely, 
the disempowered Thai Cordelia and Malay-speaking servant characters 
allude to the core-periphery relationship between East Asia and Southeast 
Asia, as well as the economic status of Malays in Singaporean society.8 The 
Mother is portrayed as a seamstress, a paradigmatic invocation of 
subalternity which situates the plot within the historical narrative of global 
capitalism.9 The Older Daughter's attempt to distance herself from the 
lowborn Mother ("Not a drop of your blood / But only father's blood runs in 
me / Only the blood of a king" [Scene 4]) resonates with the Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries' postwar economic self-transformations, effected in 
part by outsourcing class differentials to guest labourers and neighbouring 
states (cf. Yeoh 2006; Razzaque and Chang 2002). It further recalls 
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postcolonial states' fraught claim to the cultural inheritances of their 
deposed colonial patriarchs.10 
 In the program notes to the 1999 production of Lear, producer Hata 
appraises the 1997 production as an aesthetically effective and socially 
relevant work of art: "[the] intention to have the Older Daughter's patricide 
interpreted as a transcendence of the old order was well received by 
audiences… In short, we achieved our aim of sparking debate" (1999).  
Success with audiences aside, Lear has certainly provoked debate among 
critics and scholars. Ong's detractors impugn his work as mere late capitalist 
spectacle11 (cf. Bharucha 2001, 2004; Peterson 2003; Wee 2004; Thompkins 
2005; Yong 2005). In a series of influential articles, for example, Rustom 
Bharucha observes that Ong's technique of intercultural montage rests upon 
the "separation of the director's right to conceptualize from the relatively 
unformulated embodied knowledge of the performers" (2004: 10). Bharucha 
argues that this technique "disdains any sustained engagement with the 
emotional content and inner logic of the theatrical forms themselves" (2001: 
125). Moreover, it replicates the control exercised by Singaporean and East 
Asian capital over South and Southeast Asian labour and resources12 (2004: 
3). Closely following Debord, Bharucha maintains that even when such 
allegorical spectacles are outwardly critical, they tacitly work to legitimise 
structural injustice by marking it as ubiquitous and irresistible. In Debord's 
terms, Ong's intercultural mise-en-scène provides a "visual reflection of the 
ruling economic order" which functions as its own apology, fatally 
combining "the false despair of non-dialectical critique and the false 





Rather than jumping immediately into the debate over cultural property and 
identity politics, I would like to detour through the previously neglected 
topic of the language of the texts at hand. The thematic centre of both 
Shakespeare's and Kishida's texts is the aporetic relationship between 
language, property and authority. From a political historical perspective, the 
core tragedy of King Lear unfolds in the first act. Lear unwittingly authors 
his own downfall by asking his daughters to trade "words of love" for land, 
and seals it by dividing his kingdom and stripping Cordelia of her 
"propinquity and property of blood" (I.i.48–53, 198, 119). This threatens to 
supplant the feudal logic of non-exchangeable hereditary title with the 
liberal logic of persuasion and contractual exchange.13 Among 
Shakespeare's plays, King Lear is not alone in pitting feudal-aristocratic 
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protagonists against possessive individualist antagonists. Borrowing 
Machiavelli's turn of phrase, Wyndham Lewis describes this as a contest 
between "the lion and the fox" (1927: 11).  Shakespeare's "foxes"—in this 
case, Goneril, Regan and particularly Edmund—do not recognise the 
legitimacy of the hierarchies which limit their ambitions. By exploiting their 
superiors' belief that "good effects may spring from words of love," they 
open the door to social mobility, at the cost of fracturing the community14 
(I.i.198). The result is a "war of every one against every one … [waged] by 
force or wiles" (Hobbes 1651: XIII).     
 Ong and Kishida's Lear transposes the themes of language, property 
and authority into a contemporary political historical context. Like King 
Lear, Kishida's script is pointedly aware of its own linguistic provenance. 
As if proceeding directly out of Shakespeare's "exeunt with a dead march" 
(V.iii), the production opens with a musical evocation of the voices of the 
dead, "their lives cut short before their spirits or bodies had faded, buried 
clasping the seeds of enduring bitterness in their hands"15 (Scene 1). The 
ghost of King Lear then enters and rhetorically asks the nature of his own 
identity. The Older Daughter enters and answers, "you are the father who 
made me, the king who made this country"; the Fool then runs onstage to 
flurry of gamelan music, declaring that "a king is a person who rests upon 
peoples' sacrificial offerings, the moans of sacrificial offerings… Ah! The 
infant crying in hunger; the weeping mother has no milk, and you have no 
ear to lend to this." Throughout the play, Kishida develops this motif of 
singing and crying voices punctuating a vicious circle of suffering and 
betrayal.   
 The Older Daughter is Kishida's primary mouthpiece. She realises 
Hobbes' equation of force and wiles, boasting to the Younger Daughter that 
"words are weapons" and promises "disappear like smoke" (Scene 2). The 
Older Daughter articulates this attitude most pointedly in a dressing-down 
which she gives to the Old Man after having claimed his throne: 
 
 "I came to know both good and evil words from you. While you 
sat me on your knee and taught me the meaning of love, you 
ordered the beheading of traitors. While you laid me to sleep 
and bid me dream pleasant dreams, you commanded the seizure 
of your enemies' lands. So now, I return these words to you. 
Teaching this daughter of yours was like throwing seeds to the 
wind––it did you no good. The moment I first sat on the throne, 
the law of blood binding father to daughter was torn to pieces" 
(Scene 5).   
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The figure of the Older Daughter turning the Old Man's own words 
against him is highly Shakespearean. As A. C. Bradley writes, "The idea of 
the tragic hero as a being destroyed simply and solely by external forces is 
quite alien [to Shakespeare]; and not less so is the idea of the hero as 
contributing to his destruction only by acts in which we see no flaw" (1919: 
21–22). In Kishida's script, as in Shakespeare's, Lear himself sets the 
precedent for his own displacement.  Beneath a façade of legitimate 
authority, he employs the same Machiavellian tactics which his daughter 
later uses to justify her coup. 
 In Marxian terms, the Older Daughter's monologue can be understood 
as an indictment of primitive accumulation16 (Marx 1975: 704–723). This 
was a relevant subject in early modern England (707). The Tudor and Stuart 
periods saw an increase in the practice of enclosure––the privatisation of 
common lands––which often entailed the transformation of tenants and 
freeholders into wage-labourers and peons (Boyle 2003: 35). The various 
acts of dispossession and banishment in King Lear analogise this "forcible 
expropriation of the people from the soil" (cf. Marx 1975: 723). Likewise, 
Edgar's transformation into the vagrant Tom O'Bedlam vividly recalls the 
rural masses displaced through enclosure17 (cf. Blomley 2007: 2). It is 
reasonable to assume that Kishida, a socially committed playwright, was 
aware of these historical resonances while writing Lear. Through the Older 
Daughter, she revisits Shakespeare's veiled critique of the contradictions 
generated during periods of intensive social change. Unlike Shakespeare, 
however, who only addresses these contradictions on an allegorical register, 
Kishida explicitly discloses the "force and fraud" upon which the Old Man 
has constructed his paper-thin claim to legitimate ownership and authority 
(cf. Rose 1998: 624).  
 These various revisions evince a distinctly modern understanding of 
tragedy which distinguishes Lear from its Shakespearean precedent. The 
tragedy of King Lear is the result of specific speech-acts: Lear's "seduction 
by loving words" and division of his kingdom18 (cf. Haigh 1988: 98). In 
Aristotelian fashion, these actions' unravelling and their agents' deaths 
indicate that the kingdom's life can begin anew. By the end of the fifth act, 
the audience can rest in their knowledge that, as Edmund says, "The wheel 
has come full circle" (V.iii.205). In Kishida's reinterpretation, on the other 
hand, there is no single motive instance and no final dénouement. Rather 
than abdicating, the Old Man allows the Older Daughter to steward the 
kingdom while he travels (Scene 2). She then simply refuses to return the 
throne (Scene 5). Even the Old Man's Fool eventually betrays him, stating 
that he will "find a king who knows how to play with words" (Scene 9). 
Likewise, the Older Daughter's Retainer plots to betray her, announcing to 
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his Warriors that "a new king will arise from among those who know 
starvation"19 (Scene 11).  The Older Daughter discovers his plot and kills 
him during their lovemaking, but this brings her sorrow rather than catharsis 
(Scene 15).  In the play's final scene, the Older Daughter, having murdered 
or banished all of the other characters, mutters "who is behind me?" while 
haunted by the phantom of the Mother (Scene 17). The implication, of 
course, is that she will eventually be betrayed and usurped in turn. 
 Kishida's reworked narrative evokes a Brechtian conception of 
tragedy as systematic and cyclical rather than character-driven and linear. In 
late capitalist society, Brecht writes, "Catastrophes do not progress in a 
straight line but cyclical crises; the 'heroes' change with the different phases, 
are interchangeable, etc.; the graph of people's actions is complicated by 
abortive actions; fate is no longer a single coherent power; rather, there are 
fields of force which can be seen radiating in opposite directions; the power 
groups themselves comprise movements not only against  one another but 
within themselves, etc., etc." (1964: 30).     
Here, Brecht tracks a key difference between early modern and 
contemporary understandings of authority, agency and tragedy. As King 
Lear spirals to a close, Shakespeare admits that the symbolism of authority 
is often misused: "through tatter'd clothes small vices do appear; robes and 
furr'd gowns hide all" (IV.iv.180–181). In the final instance, however, he 
upholds the distinction between legitimate, blood-borne authority and mere 
force (V.iii.358–360). Kishida radicalises the critique of authority by 
portraying all claims to legitimacy as riddled with systemic contradictions. 
The Old Man need not overreach or contradict his own authority in order to 
incept the Hobbesian bellum omnum contra omnes, because all authority is 
merely violence deferred. Taking her cue from Edmund's bitter first 




EVERY CREED AND EVERY RACE  
 
This re-reading of Kishida's text enables a productive re-reading of Ong's 
dramaturgy and the socially-embedded "text" of the performance event. The 
most striking feature of Ong's aesthetic is his "predilection for dissolving 
characters into kinetic principles… abstractions and archetypes" (Bharucha 
2001: 114). In Lear, costume, gesture, music and language are employed to 
bind each character-archetype to a normative ethnic-national identity. It is 
possible to interpret this as a simple exercise in stereotyping, or an uncritical 
doubling of state-sponsored ethnic-racial nationalisms (cf. Peterson 2001; 
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Wee 2004). It is equally possible, however, to interpret it in Brechtian terms 
as a form of oblique critical intervention. This would be in keeping with 
Kishida's approach to Shakespeare, which mirrors Brecht's own interpretive 
focus on the violence and social contradiction in early modern English 
drama (see, for example, Brecht's discussion of his adaptation of Edward II 
[1964: 116]).    
 In his well-known essay "On Commitment," Theodor Adorno 
analyses Brecht's "elimination of the traditional concept of dramatic 
character" as a politically committed form of "didactic poetics": 
 
 "[Brecht] realized that the surface of social life, the sphere of 
consumption, which includes the psychologically motivated 
actions of individuals, occludes the  essence of society––
which, as the law of exchange, is abstract… He therefore 
sought to translate the true hideousness of society into 
theatrical appearance, by dragging it straight out from its 
camouflage. The people on his stage shrink before our eyes 
into the agents of social processes and functions, which 
indirectly and unknowingly they are in empirical reality" 
(1978: 9).  
 
While Ong's methodology is less rigorous and systematic than Brecht's, I 
believe that his aesthetic is too studied and ambivalent to be dismissed as 
simple stereotyping or cosmopolitan triumphalism. Rather, it evinces an 
acute anxiety of the "social processes and functions" through which 
Singaporeans are interpellated as political subjects. Much as Brecht's 
reduction of characters to class archetypes sought to reveal the economic 
determinacy of late capitalist society in general, Ong's reduction of 
characters to ethnic-racial archetypes parallels the enforced multilingualism 
and multiracialism of Singaporean society.   
 In both Ong's production and PAP's ideology, we find careful 
dramaturgies of race and divisions of linguistic labour. As a number of 
Singaporean scholars have observed, the PAP government inherited colonial 
structures of knowledge and administration bound to a racialised hierarchy 
of languages (Purushotam 1998: 9–10; cf. Chua 2007). The government has 
reinscribed these structures by mandating that children study both English 
and their ethnic-racial "mother tongue"20 (Mandarin, Malay or Tamil).  
Needless to say, "mother tongue" education has worked to reify the CMIO 
taxonomy by gradually flattening intra-racial linguistic difference.21 It has 
also generated a clear racial-linguistic division of discursive labour. English 
is marked as the language of business and governance, while "expression in 
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any of the other three official Asian languages is immediately read as 
'signifying' and 'representing' the interests of the respective 'races'" (Chua 
2007: 923).  
 This division exemplifies the PAP government's ethnic corporatist 
approach to the management of collective identity (Brown 2004). In its 
classical formulation, corporatism involves redefining sub-national social 
groups (such as ethnicities, guilds, kinship groups, etc.) as "true and proper 
organs of the state" which function to "direct and coordinate labour and 
capital in matters of common interest" (Freiburg theses of 1884, cited in 
Brown 2004: 37). In order for these "organs" to be reliably managed, 
however, sub- and extra-national loyalties must be either assimilated to 
national loyalties or suppressed (52). One effective way to manage ethnic 
loyalties is by actively promoting socialisation along ethnic lines within a 
prescribed, state-mediated institutional framework (54). This allows the 
state to supervise intra-ethnic social activity, and to regulate it when needed. 
Ideally, it also allows the state to guide emergent ethnic practices and 
solidarities. 
 Singaporean multiracialism does precisely this. As previously 
mentioned, the state has institutionalised the CMIO system politically, 
culturally and economically. On the political and cultural levels, this is 
accomplished through the Group Representation Constituency system, 
"mother tongue" education, and the promotion of racial-cultural traditions 
and events.22 On the economic level, it is accomplished through the 
cultivation of intra-racial dependency networks. Because the PAP is 
ideologically opposed to the "welfare state," it delegates social welfare 
responsibilities to three semi-autonomous racial "self-help organisations": 
the Malay-Singaporean organisation Yayasan Majlis Pendidikan Anak-anak 
Islam (Mendaki), the Singapore Indian Development Agency (SINDA) and 
the Chinese Development Assistance Council23 (CDAC). This structure is 
reproduced on the local level by community associations, which serve social 
and "quasi-kinship" functions (language promotion, funerary services, etc.) 
(Clammer 1997: 259). These interlocking institutions promote assimilation 
to racialised behavioural norms, which the state then represents as evidence 
of racial-cultural "essence" (Chua 2007: 924–925). At the same time, they 
reinforce a joint image of racial and national identity, as expressed in the 
figure of the "hyphenated Singaporean" (1996).  
 As Chua observes, racialisation also expedites the manipulation of 
popular anxieties to ideological ends (2007: 925). Despite its neoliberal 
economics, the PAP commonly portrays social liberalisation as a threat to 
"Asian Values" and racial-cultural survival (2003: 61). This mobilises fears 
of deracination among conservative factions within the racial communities, 
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thus aiding the legitimisation of illiberal political practices. Similarly, while 
multiracialism is officially represented as integral to Singaporean identity, 
the state-affiliated media habitually plays up racial difference and stokes 
fears of interracial strife. This allows the "racially neutral" state to represent 
itself as a necessary mediator, and authorises the suppression of sub-national 
politics. It also helps dissemble the uneven costs and benefits of 
development by re-mapping class and status inequality as racial-cultural 
difference (2007: 917). Accordingly, maldistibutive institutions can be 
written off as "cultural preferences" or even "cultural rights," and the 
government's refusal to address maldistribution can be justified as deference 
to the autonomy of the racial communities. 
 These ideological manoeuvres disclose the reciprocal relationship 
between universalism and particularism in modern society. Immanuel 
Wallerstein provides the classic exposition of this paradoxical relationship 
(1991). Because non-market-based value systems restrict the flow of 
commodities, they are hypothetically inimical to capitalism (31). In an 
ideal-type capitalist economy, "meritocracy" would entail the self-regulating 
commodification of labour and human capacities. In actual economies, 
however, elites manipulate and circumvent the market's hypothetical self-
regulatory processes. The simplest means of doing this is by transmitting 
capital and commodifiable capacities to one's descendants (150–151). A 
related, more complex means is the "ethnicisation of the work force," i.e., 
the recoding of cultural or genetic attributes as socioeconomic merits and 
shortcomings, and vice versa (33). Singaporean multilingualism exemplifies 
this. Hypothetically, because English is not an Asian "mother tongue," 
mandated bilingualism offers a "level playing field." In actuality, because 
privileged children tend to receive superior English educations, it serves to 
reproduce privilege. The racial self-help system also fits this mold. The 
economic primacy of the Chinese-Singaporean community allows the 
CDAC to accumulate more capital than Mendaki and SINDA; this capital is 
then recirculated within the racial community. By restricting wealth 
redistribution and educational assistance along racial lines, the self-help 
system helps reify the correlation between race and status. While more data 
is needed, Chua suggests that this has actually intensified racial inequality 
rather than helping to ameliorate it (2007: 920).   
 Over the past few centuries, we have come to realise that particularist 
institutions such as ethnic-racial divisions of labour and hereditary 
plutocracy are perfectly capable of surviving within states which formally 
guarantee universal equality (cf. Wallerstein 1991). The Singaporean case 
helps explain such survivals. In corporatist terms, both the family and the 
racial community can be thought of as distinct but heteronomous "organs" 
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which assist in the life of the state. Singapore offers a paradigmatic example 
of how such "organs" can ease the burden of governance by regulating the 
transmission of capital and ensuring the reproduction of norms in ways that 
are favourable to elites. Delegating community-level politics to racial and 
kinship groups has the added benefit of enabling the PAP to portray itself as 
immune to "identity politics" and "special interests" (Brown 2004: 70). This 
expedites its "technocratic"––one could say directorial––approach to 
governance.  
 The Singaporean state's complex choreography of racial and linguistic 
difference finds its theatrical counterpart in Lear. In both, racial and 
linguistic differences appear as calculated effects of totalising structural 
forces. This parallels the more substratal tension between the ostensibly 
autonomous individual and the heteronomy of market-based society 
(Wallerstein 1991). Brecht's alienation or distancing effect 
(Verfremdungseffekt) offers a strategy for concretising this tension. By 
defamiliarising the mise-en-scène and alienating the spectator, Brecht 
sought to divulge the contradiction between the subjective experience of 
"aesthetic individuation" and the empirical fact of economic determination 
(Adorno 1978). Similarly, Ong's fragmented and alienating dramaturgy 
allegorises the aporetic yet functional relationship between the 
epiphenomenon of ethnic-racial particularism and the universalising logic of 
the "technocratic" globalist state. The Singaporean propaganda song "One 
People, One Nation, One Singapore" depicts this division-of-labour 
approach to social difference with surprising frankness: "Every creed and 
every race, has its role and has its place."    
 In Lear, the shock of alienation is most tangible in Ong's treatment of 
language. His textual basis is Kishida's assertion that language is violently 
affecting ("words are weapons"), yet frustratingly ephemeral (they 
"disappear like smoke") (Scene 2). In the opening few scenes of Lear, the 
tension between languages and cultural markers is naively alluring. It is not 
long, however, before this tension erupts into naked aggression. This drives 
at the unique anxiety of witnessing harsh words exchanged in foreign 
tongues. In addition to its semiotic function, speech bears an implicit 
socialising function and an almost physical capacity to convey force (Brecht 
and Heinrich Müller referred to this as Gestus [cf. Diamond 1988]). One 
need not necessarily understand words to sense whether they are being 
spoken from a position of mastery or submission, or to gauge their weight as 
summons, threats, rebukes, petitions or pleas. Such words demand a 
response: as Brecht puts it, "the spectator, instead of being enabled to have 
an experience, is forced as it were to cast his vote" (1977: 39). Constrained 
by a lack of communicative competence, however, the spectator feels 
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divested of the ability to respond in good faith. In Brechtian fashion, this 
replicates the consensual domination and complicity in systemic violence 





Singaporean ethnic-racial corporatism can be described as "an attempt to 
reconcile two apparently antithetical ideas: the image of society and the 
state as comprising a natural, authentic, gemeinschaft community; and the 
image of society as an unintegrated aggregation of disparate groups" 
(Brown 2004: 48–49). In this paper, I have argued that this begs a 
reappraisal of Kishida and Ong's adaptation of King Lear, a play commonly 
described by Shakespeare scholars as an allegory for "the shift of Western 
culture from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from organic community to 
atomistic state" (Delany 1977: 431). I have sought to demonstrate how 
Ong's fragmented yet strictly controlled intercultural aesthetic mimes the 
PAP state's carefully orchestrated attempt to manage "organic" ethnic-racial 
solidarities. I have further suggested that because this mimesis conveys a 
shock of alienation rather than a sense of familiarity or catharsis, it can be 
read as a type of critical intervention, geared to reveal contradictions 
between everyday social experiences and deeper structural processes. 
 Of course, reading Lear as a critical intervention inevitably raises the 
question of Ong's own alleged complicity in the "New Asian" statist-
capitalist project (cf. Bharucha 2001; Peterson 2001; etc.). It is no secret that 
Lear was "made possible" by the Japan Foundation, the National Arts 
Council of Singapore and a variety of festivals and advertisers.24 Given its 
lavish production value, one must wonder whether it would have seen the 
stage if not for Japan's "Southeast Asia pivot" and Singaporean Prime 
Minister (PM) Goh Chok Tong's campaign to turn his city into a "cultural 
centre in the globalised world"25 (Chong 2003: 6). In a recent interview, 
Ong partially addresses this critique, acknowledging that the Japan 
Foundation's activities "could be seen as a continued postwar effort in 
Southeast Asia and East Asia using culture as a remedial action" (2007: 62). 
Interestingly, he goes on to distance himself from the production, suggesting 
that "it was always seen as the Japan Foundation's Lear" and dismissing it as 
"a romantic first flush of the 'joys' of interculturalism."    
 While Ong's displacement of ownership to the Japan Foundation may 
be justified, his dismissal evokes an ironic cliché: the sophisticate who, in 
the throes of a "romantic first flush," creates a thing he later comes to regret.  
This, of course, is the conceit behind King Lear's Edmund, conceived "in 
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the lusty stealth of nature" and then discounted as illegitimate at 
Gloucester's convenience––"an admirable evasion of whoremaster man" 
(I.ii.11, 133–134). Ong and Gloucester's parallel evasions recall Derrida's 
deconstruction of the metonymic links between patrimonial and authorial 
claims (1981: 80). This deconstruction hinges on the fundamental 
ambivalence of theories of property and authority (cf. Heller 1998). Derrida 
proposes that we can envision language itself as an "impossible property"––
which is to say, a limit-point of the concept of property (1998: 63). We 
commonly think of our speech and writing as intimately our own, yet at 
their place of articulation or inscription, they quite literally become mere 
sequences of mechanical effects. What was most "subjective" is suddenly 
something we have cast away (obicere) and then find put before us 
(objectum) as part of our environing world. Through misunderstanding and 
misappropriation, our speech and writing affect others and the world in 
ways we cannot predict. We thus become authors of events which we did 
not necessarily authorise, and to which we ourselves are vulnerable. In this, 
it is possible to compare the writer to the patricide and the regicide. All 
three authorise the production of difference (a new text, lineage, regime) by 
violating the totalising claims of their forebears. In doing so, they invite 
violation in turn. This "appropriative madness" shatters the myth of 
legitimacy (1998: 24). As both King Lear and Lear demonstrate, "the 
father's death opens the reign of violence. In choosing violence… the son––
or patricidal writing––cannot fail to expose himself, too"26 (1981: 146).   
 These insights open new perspectives on the question of cultural 
property. As previously mentioned, we often imagine cultural studies as 
caught between "the Scylla of [globalist] cultural relativism and the 
Charybdis of nativist culturalism" (Spivak 1999: 6). It is an undisputed fact 
that "nativist culturalism" has played a powerful role in anticolonial and 
postcolonial struggles worldwide. This fact sometimes leads us to assume 
that it offers a kind of transposable site of resistance to neocolonialism and 
the marketisation of culture (209). The historical credits of culturalism, 
however, have no necessary bearing on its role in contemporary Singapore. 
Indeed, the Singaporean case demonstrates how culturalist ideologies and 
institutions can be integrated quite easily into the framework of an 
aggressively globalist state. This reconciliation is symbolised by the 
ubiquitous figure of the hyphenated "racial-Singaporean" (Chua 1996: 51). 
 One could argue that Singapore's multiracial and multilingual policies 
offer a prototypical example of "the cultural logic of multinational 
capitalism," i.e., the carefully regulated, socially productive relation 
between "[the] particular ethnic Thing (patriotism, pro patria mori and so 
forth) and the (potentially) universal function of the market" (Zizek 1997: 
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42). The Singaporean case also divulges the potential shortcomings of this 
logic. Far from acting as a barrier to alienation and the commodification of 
everyday life, Singaporean ethnic-racial corporatism enables elites to mark 
off "the everyday practices that are part and parcel of modern capitalism as 
not integral to the cultures of racialised Singaporeans" (Chua 2003: 67).  
Furthermore, it mandates the suppression of intra-"racial" difference, 
whether ethnic, sexual, religious or merely personal. A number of 
contemporary Singaporean writers and performing artists have focused on 
the spectral presence of this social collateral, portraying the "racial-
Singaporean" as the sum of a history of exclusions, myths and anxieties––as 
Chua puts it, an "absence after the hyphen" (1996: 62). State multiracialism 
may successfully dissemble the outward symptoms of this pathological 
history, but only by deferring confrontation with the pathogen itself. In the 
end, "the silence of that hyphen does not pacify or appease anything, not a 
single torment, not a single torture" (Derrida 1998: 12).  
 I will conclude by proposing that rather than taking a partisan 
globalist or culturalist position, Ong and Kishida's Lear seeks merely to 
break the "silence of the hyphen." It does so at the price of violating the 
ostensible self-sufficiency and authenticity of its artistic forebears. Ong is 
well aware of the symbolic links between authenticity and authority on the 
one hand, and hybridity and "bastardy" on the other. Like Shakespeare's 
Edmund, he casts his lot with bastardy, claiming that "the rigid meaning of 
tradition has little significance in the world of the twenty-first century, 
where walls are breaking down" (1999). From a stable cultural nationalist 
position, this can rightly be criticised as a surrender to "atomised alienation" 
(Bharucha 2001: 124). From a position of unwilled and inescapable 
hybridity, however, it is possible to see how this could comprise a sincere 
attempt to work through the political complexities of identity-formation in a 
"state without a nation" (Chua 2003: 66). Particularly within the context of 
late-1990s Singaporean ethnic corporatism, Kishida's deconstruction of the 
concept of legitimacy and Ong's refusal of the false opposition between 
universalism and particularism can be interpreted as inherently critical. The 
result may be politically "tentative," but it is not socially insignificant 
(Bharucha 2001: 122). After all, as producer Hata reminds us, the "task of 
transcending our fathers––not only the father named Lear but also various 
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1  This attitude is manifest most clearly in the cultural nationalist tendency toward "hoarding cultural 
objects," a practice which, in Merryman's opinion, "serves no discernible domestic purpose other than 
asserting the right to keep them" and "fail[s] to exploit such objects as a valuable resource for trade 
and… contribute[s] to the cultural impoverishment of people in other parts of the world" (1986: 847).       
2  Brandon identifies Utpat Dutt's 1951 Bengali Macbeth, which synthesises elements of the Western 
realist tradition with music and dance in the local jatra style, as perhaps the first modern intercultural 
Asian Shakespeare production (1997: 20). More recent well-known examples include Ninagawa 
Yukio's Ninagawa Macbeth (1980), Wu Hsing Kuo's Beijing Opera Macbeth (1986), the Shanghai 
Kunqu Opera Company's Kunqu Macbeth (1987), the New Delhi International Kathakali Centre's 
Kathakali King Lear (1989), Nomura Mansaku's Kyōgen Falstaff (1994) and Ong's Desdemona (2000), 
Search: Hamlet (2002) and Lear Dreaming (2012).    
3  Shakespeare's King Lear is based on the myth of Leir of Briton, popularised by Geoffrey of 
Monmouth's Historia Regum Brittania. The history of this myth has been "a history of narrative and 
textual instability, with the story cast into many generic moulds and adapted into many different forms 
of cultural production"––often for explicitly political purposes (Holderness and Carter 1996: 6). In 
Geoffrey's narrative, Leir reclaims the throne and is succeeded by Cordelia. Shakespeare's revised plot, 
in which Lear and Cordelia die and Albany (or Edgar) presumedly assumes the throne, doubles the 
single most important political event of its time, the decline of the childless Tudor house and the 
foundation of a new royal line (the Stuarts). Assessing Shakespeare's narrative revisions vis-à-vis his 
social position and aspirations, it is difficult not to brand him an ideologue (cf. Halpern 1991; Dodd 
1999). Indeed, Halpern suspects that Shakespeare composed King Lear specifically to win James I 
Stuart's favour, perhaps hoping for an official court performance (1991: 219). 
4  Any allegorical interpretation of postcolonial cultural production should mention Frederic Jameson's 
controversial model of "Third World" literature as "national allegory," in which "the telling of the 
individual story and the individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling 
of the [political] experience of the collectivity itself" (1986: 85–86). Much ink has been spilled in 
protest and defence of Jameson's formulation. With reference to the texts at hand, this article will 
acknowledge Jameson's basic premise, which is that "the psychological points to the political and the 
trauma of subalternity finds itself 'projected outwards' (allegorically) into the 'cultural'" (Szeman 2001: 
809–810). As a form of interventionist political practice, postcolonial literary criticism aims "to 
produce an authentic and sovereign subjectivity and collectivity by undoing the set of habits called 
subalternity," i.e., to decolonise the psyche by first decolonising culture (810). 
5  According to Heng and Devan, "The trope of father and daughter is so commonly invoked in Singapore 
to express the relationship between the governing political party [PAP]… and the nation itself, as to be 
fully naturalized, passing unremarked. Singapore is never imagined, by its government or citizens, as a 
'motherland' or 'mother country' (identifications reserved exclusively for the ancestral countries of 
origin of Singapore's various racial groups – India, China, etc.), but rather as a female child, or at best, 
an adolescent girl or 'young lady.' A letter to a national newspaper, entitled 'Dear PAPa… ,' and signed 
by 'Singapore, A Young Lady,' in the persona of a respectful growing daughter petitioning for greater 
freedom from her stern father captures the tenor of the relationship perfectly (The Straits Times 
[Singapore] 5 January 1985) (An answering letter, fictitiously from 'PAPa,' subsequently appeared in 
the same newspaper)" (1995: 209). 
6  The state grounds patrilineality in sociobiological discourse by assigning children their father's race, a 
practice which implies that "while formally a child naturally inherits genetic material from each parent 
equally, in reality it is the male genes that somehow predominate" (Clammer 1997: 263). Three-tiered 
patrilineal families are incentivised through preferential access to public housing, cash grants for 
couples who buy housing within two kilometres of their parents, regulations obliging working children 
to support their retired parents, and baby bonuses and tax relief for parents of up to four children (Teo 
2010: 340). The state also mandates sixteen weeks of maternity leave for employed married women, 
with the cost split between the state and the employer (as opposed to three days of optional paternity 
IJAPS, Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 2014)         Impossible Properties 
28 
 
leave for working fathers).  In addition, working mothers can claim additional tax relief for privately 
procured child care ("foreign maid levy relief" or "grandparent care-giver relief") (347). As a result of 
these incentives, many middle-class couples have come to perceive a certain sequence of 
institutionally-mediated experiences as normatively Singaporean: for example, planning one's 
Registration of Marriage ("ROM-ing") and filing with the Housing and Development Board (HDB) in 
order to secure a desirable flat (343). 
7  Examples include the education of children in their "racial mother tongue," the promotion of holidays 
and events which reflect "racial-cultural traditions," the managed racialisation of the electoral system 
via Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), and the racialisation of social welfare through "self-
help organisations" (Chua 2007).  
8  The 2010 Census indicates that the average/median monthly household income from work by race was 
$7,236/5,100 (Singapore Dollar) for Chinese (up from $5,258/3,800 in 2000), $4,575/3,844 for Malays 
(up from $3,151/2,709), $7,664/5,370 for Indians (up from $4,623/3,438), and $11,518/7,432 for 
Others (up from $7,446/4,870). The average household size hovered around 3.4–3.7 for Chinese, 
Indians and Others, and at 4.2 for Malays. Regarding housing, despite their larger average family size, 
Malays were twice as likely to live in one or two-room HDB flats (8.7 percent as compared with 4.1 
percent of Chinese, 4.9 percent of Indians and 2.1 percent of Others), while only 2.8 percent of Malays 
lived in private flats or landed properties (compared with 18 percent of Chinese, 16.3 percent of Indians 
and 36.5 percent of Others). The 2007/08 Household Expenditure Survey identifies private flat or 
landed property ownership as a reliable indicator of consumer ability (average monthly household 
expenditure of $7,311 as opposed to $3,138 for HDB households). 
9  It is interesting to note that the protagonist of Kishida's most well-known play, Ito jigoku (Thread Hell), 
is also a seamstress working at an interwar period Japanese silk mill which is a front for a brothel. As a 
low-technology, labour-intensive industry, textile production has often served as a vanguard to further 
industrial development, including in Shakespearean England (cf. Sharpe 1998), interwar Japan (cf. 
Tsurumi 1984), and contemporary South and Southeast Asia (cf. Robert 1983). The textile industry 
exemplifies the role of developing economies within the modern world-system, and the female textile 
worker has been trapped at the bottom of the world-economic hierarchy for centuries. In a sense, the 
female textile worker exemplifies Gayatri Spivak's ideal-typical category of "the poorest woman of the 
South" (1999: 6).   
10 This is also clearly relevant to Singapore, an English-speaking Commonwealth state which proudly 
maintains certain colonial traditions and institutions, yet which has also sought to shape an endogenous 
Asian alternative to Western modernity. Paradoxically, for example, the British foreign secretary once 
called Singaporean elder statesman and outspoken critic of Western liberalism Lee Kuan Yew "the best 
bloody Englishman east of the Suez" (Zakaria 1994: 125). In a sense, Lee's ambivalent relationship to 
his Western intellectual heritage mirrors Singapore's own ambivalent relationship to the West. 
11 The term "spectacle" is massively overdetermined, and I feel the need to clarify its use. Rustom 
Bharucha sets off the critique of postmodern interculturalism as spectacle in his article "Consumed in 
Singapore: The intercultural spectacle of Lear," which adopts Debord's definition of spectacle as "a 
social relationship between people that is mediated by… signs of the dominant form of production" 
(1967/1994: 5–6, 10; cited in Bharucha 2001: 109, 118). Bharucha does not problematise or amend 
Debord's usage. Peterson (2003) and Tompkins (2005) both cite Bharucha throughout their appraisals 
of Lear. Wee does not cite Bharucha verbatim, but does assert that Ong's "management of spectacle 
highlights the parameters of statist and capitalist modernity" (2004: 784). Similarly, Yong identifies 
spectacle with "the enabling fiction of a comfortable cultural positionality," and argues that while Ong 
brings this fiction into question, he does so "as an intercultural strategy marketed along the global 
theatre festival trade route" (2005: 538). All of these uses conform to Debord's concept of spectacle as a 
uniquely late capitalist mode of ideological production—in Debord's words, the "materialization of 
ideology… which is precipitated by the concrete success of an autonomous economic system of 
production… [which] manages to remold the whole of the real to its own specifications" (1994: 212).   
12  A number of scholars have echoed Bharucha's opinions. Peterson, for example, concurs that Ong's 
work follows Peter Brook in "appropriating context-free bits and pieces of Asian traditions into 
narrative-driven, essentially Western dramaturgical structures," thereby demonstrating that "Asians are 
just as capable of contextless cultural appropriation as Westerners" (2003: 92). Wee argues that Lear is 
"unsuccessful in breaking out of older national modernist uses of cultural memory so as to combine 
high cultures into a regional identity" (2004: 792). Similarly, Thompkins contends that Ong's "re-
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reading of Shakespeare through the constituent cultures of Singapore that may be said to describe 'New 
Asia' overlooks the effects of specific and local politics on its own representation" (2005: 622). Finally, 
Yong questions the meaningfulness of Ong's postmodern aesthetic, likening its effect to "television 
surfing between Asian channels" (2005: 536).  
13  In 1603, when King Lear was written, the political implications of this were radical. The former logic 
bound property and authority to the crown and its feudatories on an ontic level, while the latter sought 
to subject property and authority to an autonomous code of law representative of the "common 
interest." This clash of logics is evident in conflicts between the recently crowned James I and 
parliament. The liberal position was exemplified by progressive jurists such as Thomas Craig and 
Edward Coke, who describes the institutions of Parliament as "declaratories of the ancient common 
laws of England, to the observation, and keeping whereof, the king was bound and sworn" (Coke 1797 
vol. 2: 5). James I asserted the absolutist position in his own political treatises, declaring, for example, 
that "kings were the authors and makers of the laws, and not the laws of the kings" (The True Law of 
Free Monarchies).   
14 A number of scholars have followed Lewis in reading this as an allegory for the seventeenth century 
growth pangs of political and economic "modernity"––the shift "from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, 
from organic community to atomistic state" (Delany 1977: 431; cf. Burke 1959; Danby 1961; Tillyard 
1962; Colie 1972; Halpern 1991; Holbrook 2000). Delany suggests that we can see this tension most 
clearly in Shakespeare's treatment of the trope of social bonds. Cordelia is distinguished by her honest 
exhortation of her filial bond (I.i.96). Likewise, Kent declares himself bound by honour to give honest 
council to Lear despite his displeasure (I.i.155). Edmund, on the other hand, announces that he is bound 
to the law of nature alone, and disparages "idle and fond bondage in the oppression of aged tyranny" 
(I.ii.1, 50). Mislead by Edmund, Gloucester proceeds to predict the onset of social crisis: "in cities, 
mutinies; in countries, discord; in palaces, treason; and the bond cracked betwixt son and father" 
(I.ii.110–113). Later, when Lear begins to awaken to Regan's treachery, he implores her to recall "the 
offices of nature, bond of childhood," to no avail (II.iv.192). 
15 Citations and analysis are based on the 1997 Tokyo production, which was broadcast with Japanese 
subtitles on the television program "Geijutsu gekijō." All translations are my own.  
16  Marx defines primitive accumulation as "the historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production" (1975: 705). This comprised "a change in the form of servitude."    
17  After expropriating former freeholders' land, elites found themselves confronted with rising numbers of 
dispossessed and dislocated former agriculturalists. Rather than adequately curbing enclosure and 
monopolies, the state responded by criminalising unemployment as "vagabondage": Elizabeth I, for 
example, mandated that "Unlicensed beggars above 14 years of age are to be severely flogged and 
branded on the left ear unless someone will take them into service for two years," while James I 
declared that "Any one wandering about and begging is declared a rogue and a vagabond… Whilst in 
prison they are to be whipped as much and as often as the justices of the peace think fit" (Marx 1975: 
723–731).  
18  Richard Halpern and William Dodd identify this plot device as a reference to the conflict between 
James I and parliament over the unification of the kingdoms of England and Scotland. In his speeches 
to in favour of unification, James I "repeatedly invoked the misfortunes that had befallen early Britain 
as the result of [the apocryphal] Brutus' division of his kingdom into three parts" (Halpern 1991: 219). 
To a period audience, King Lear's repetition of the Brutus' error would have established him as James' 
"antitype" (Dodd 1999: 485). Dodd further identifies the trope of "political seduction by loving words" 
as a reference to Elizabeth I, who had a weakness for emotive politics.  As Dodd observes, "The task 
that Lear's daughters are obliged to perform [during the first scene's so-called love test] not only 
resembles the one Elizabeth set herself; it also resembles the task she set her courtiers and councillors 
to speak 'the rhetoric and ritual of devotion'" (1999: 483). Lear's subsequent manipulation by his 
daughters hyperbolises Elizabeth's manipulation by courtiers who "[took] advantage of her oft-
expressed desire to rule with the love of the people" (Haigh 1988: 95, 114); to Dodd, both King Lear 
and his daughters "would have surely been seen by a Globe audience as exploiting [Elizabeth's] now-
threadbare mode of government" (1999: 482).  
19  It is possible to hear this as an allusion to Suharto's colonial ambitions in East Timor, Kalimantan, 
Papua and Aceh, a bitter turn of events given Indonesia's role in the nominally anti-imperialist Non-
Aligned Movement. In 1996, one year before Lear was premiered, the East Timor conflict was finally 
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thrust under the international spotlight as a result of Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-
Horta's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize (CAVR 2005: 121).  
20 Purushotam cites Chiew Seen Kong as representative of Singaporean sociological doxa on 
multilingualism and ethnicity-race: "Bilingualism in Singapore serves three functions. First, it serves to 
break down ethnic boundaries by destroying the previously perfect overlap between ethnicity and 
language. Second, it serves to break down ethnic boundaries by providing the linguistic resources for 
inter-ethnic communication and understanding through shared meanings of the linguistic resource. 
Third, it serves to reduce the previous stark inequalities in occupational opportunities and incomes 
between the English-educated and the vernacular-educated" (1983: 47). While the second two 
observations are defensible, the first is a remarkable inversion of historical realities. Comparing census 
data suggests that prior to the institutionalisation of race-languages, there was more language 
heterogeneity within the races, ergo less overlap between race and language. 
21  According to the 2010 Census of 2,928,178 Singaporeans, the languages most frequently spoken at 
home are Mandarin (1,064,157 [up from 1,010,539 in 2000]), English (871,374 [up from 665,087]), 
Malay (349,121 [down from 406,549]), Hokkien (237,147 [down from 329,583]), Cantonese (119,143 
[down from 163,703]), Tamil (94,487 [up from 91,015]), Teochew (93,811 [down from 141,569]), 
other Indian languages (34,293 [up from 19,862]), other Chinese languages (32,449 [down from 
52,418]) and "others" (32,196 [up from 7,228]). 
22  Group Representation Constituencies were implemented in 1988, and currently outnumber Single 
Member Constituencies (SMCs). A GRC ticket consists of three to six candidates, at least one of whom 
must be Malay, Indian or Other. The PAP has defended the GRC system as a means of ensuring some 
minority representation in parliament, while critics have impugned it as a form of suppressing 
opposition parties, who may not have enough recognised candidates to fill out a competitive GRC (Tan 
2005: 418). In addition, some scholars argue that GRCs "institutionalize and rigidify divisions that have 
no substantive purpose other than formalizing consciousness of 'difference'" (Hassall 1997: 16). This 
keeps low-level fears of interracial tension alive and helps the government justify interventionist social 
policies in advance (Chua 2007: 925). According to the opposition, these fears are largely ungrounded 
in reality. Notably, during the 1991 elections, both PM Goh and the Singaporean mainstream press 
attributed the PAP's reduced margin of victory to antagonistic racially-driven voting, while members of 
the opposition attributed their wins to economic frustrations (Purushotam 1998: 224).  
23 Yayasan Mendaki was established in the early 1980s by Malay Member of Parliaments (MPs) and 
business leaders with financial assistance from the government (http://www.mendaki.org.sg/); SINDA 
was established in 1991 through collaboration between the Action Committee on Indian Education 
(ACIE) and the government (http://www.sinda.org.sg/); and CDAC was established in 1992 by the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI) and the Singapore Federation of 
Chinese Clan Associations (SFCCA) (http://www.cdac.org.sg/). Each month, the state deducts a small 
amount from each working Singaporean's Central Provident Fund (CFP) account and routes it to "their" 
racial organisation. Although it is possible to opt out, this scheme "admits of no 'hybrid' spaces and 
individuals" (Chua 2007: 919). 
24  Needless to say, the state-capital-culture nexus is hardly novel. Indeed, Singaporean elites' pairing of 
statist and capitalist rhetoric and the exhortation of a celebratory public culture recalls Wyndham 
Lewis' sarcastic indictment of the "public-minded" merchants and statesmen of Shakespeare's day: "It is 
usual for the economist-historian to insist on the high sense of 'patriotic' duty of the early merchant, his 
high sense of being engaged on a sacred national work, delightfully identical with personal 
enrichment… 'Wool, sugar, turpentine and pepper / pepper, sugar, turpentine and wool' can, of course, 
be sung to the tune of the national anthem" (1927: 33–34).  
25  Whereas PM Lee unapologetically repressed heterogenous creative activity within the arts, PM Goh 
asked Singaporeans to complement economic development by cultivating an "outstanding, refreshing 
cosmopolitan society" (Straits Times 21 December 1996). In 1991, the state created the National Arts 
Council to further this objective, and in 1992 it announced a "Global City for the Arts" campaign 
administered by the Economic Development Board and Singapore Tourism Board (Chong 2003: 6). 
Former Minister for Information and the Arts B. G. Yeo made clear the economic motivations of this 
campaign in a speech given at the opening of a Japanese retail complex which included arts and 
performance spaces: "With science and mathematics, we can produce accurately and efficiently. But to 
create high value, we must also produce artistically" (Straits Times 9 October 1993; cited 31). The state 
was particularly interested in developing cultural resources which would make Singapore more 
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attractive to multinational corporations and wealthy expatriates, the so-called "transnational capitalist 
class" (cf. Robinson 2005).  
26  Interestingly, Derrida follows Marx in asserting that Shakespeare understood the aporias of property 
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